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Observations on the Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation
In recent years there has been increased pressure on the federal
judicial system for improved efficiency in dealing with "the big
case." Such cases typically involve either large numbers of plaintiffs,
suing in many district courts on essentially the same facts, or many
complex and interrelated issues which require the evaluation of
large quantities of data. Because those cases require considerable
amounts of judicial time which cannot lightly be spared from dealing with the mounting backlog of cases faced by virtually all courts,
and because a great deal of potentially protracted litigation is certain
to arise in the future, it is imperative that means be devised to deal
expeditiously with big cases. Responding to that demand, the CoOrdinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States
District Courts1 promulgated the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation (Manual) 2 in an attempt to outline methods for
dealing efficiently with such cases. The purpose of this Comment is
to discuss the Manual's significant proposals and to focus attention on
recommendations which may prove troublesome in application.3
The first officially organized attempt to deal with the big case was
prompted by a series of protracted antitrust cases ansmg
during and after World War II. 4 A committee, chaired by Judge
1. The Co-Ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation was a special subcommittee of the Committee on Pretrial Procedures and Practices of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The original members of the subcommittee were appointed
by Chief Justice Earl Warren in January 1962.
The actual administration of complex cases has been delegated to the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 29 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
2. The Manual has been published in 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE pt. 2 (2d ed.
1969) [hereinafter MANUAL].
A board of editors, headed by Senior District Judge Thomas J. Clary of the
Third Circuit, has been appointed to supervise publication and revision of the Manual.
Comments and recommendations regarding the Manual should be directed to:
The Board of Editors
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation
The Federal Judicial Center
Dolley Madison House, 1520 H Street
Washington, D.C. 20005
3. This Comment is not meant to be a thorough analysis of all the many problems
that will no doubt be encountered as the Manual becomes widely accepted and used.
Rather, the Comment's purpose is to serve as a general introductory critique of the
Manual and to focus attention on various difficulties which must be recognized and
dealt with by the judges and lawyers in order to implecent the Manual as a workable
guide for handling potentially protracted litigation.
4. E.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941),
91 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18
(N.D. Cal. 1949); United States v. New York Great Atl. &: Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp.
626 (D.C. Ill. 1946); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1945); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942);
United States v. Food &: Grocery Bureau, 43 F. Supp. 974 (S.D. Cal. 1941); see McAllister,
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E. Barrett Prettyman and composed of circuit and district judges,
was appointed in 1949 by Chief Justice Vinson to study protracted
litigation. The committee in its report, entitled Procedure in AntiTrust and Other Protracted Cases, 5 defined its duty as the elimination of the "unnecessary delay, volume and expense," caused
primarily by "(I) vagueness of the issues, (2) proffers of masses of
unnecessary evidence, and (3) lack of organization of material and
personnel." 6 The committee's report stressed that the responsibility
for streamlining these cases lay chiefly with the trial judge.7 The
principal recommendations called for the extensive use of pretrial
conferences and for detailed rules for the handling of bulk documentary evidence. The pretrial conferences were to be directed at
particularizing the issues and disposing of preliminary motions. 8 The
recommendations concerning documents called for full disclosure of
such documents to all parties prior to the use of the documents at
trial, and they set forth a procedure for proper identification techniques in order to save time at trial.9 The recommendations were
worded strongly, but the committee made it clear that their recommendations were "not ... legislation or rules" but only "a description of remedial methods and measures thought by experienced
judges to be effective."10
Several years later, Chief Justice Warren appointed a committee
composed of members of the Judicial Conference of the United
States to ensure that the Prettyman Report was properly "vitalized."
The committee held seminars in the summers of 1957,11 1958,12 and
195913 and ultimately produced the Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases (Handbook). 14 The
Handbook consisted of a series of recommendations, based on the
Prettyman Report, followed by extensive comments. As its foreword
The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64

HARV.

L. REv. 27, 33-61

(1950).
5. Reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 62 (1953) (dated Sept. 26, 1951).
6. Id. at 65-66.
7. Id. at 65.
8. Id. at 66-73.
9. Id. at 74-75. In this connection, the committee's report suggested a shifting of
the burden of proving relevancy, materiality, and competency to the party introducing
the documents. Id. at 76.
IO. Id. at 64.
II. See Proc. of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit and
District Judges, 21 F.R.D. 395 (1958) (held Aug. 26-30, 1957, at New York Univ. Law
Center).
12. See Proc. of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23
F.R.D. 319 (1959) (held Aug. 25-30, 1958, at Stanford Univ. School of Law).
13. See Proc. of a Seminar Held at the Univ. of Colorado School of Law, July
13-15, 1959 (unpublished report).
14. Reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960) (adopted March 1960).
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made clear, it similarly was not a set of rules to be strictly followed,
but merely a basic outline of procedures culled from judicial experience to be used as judges saw fit in individual cases.15
The most immediate stimulus for the :Manual, however, was the
massive private antitrust litigation arising from conspiracies in the
electrical equipment industry in the early 1960's. Over 1,900 civil
actions were filed in thirty-five district courts between 1961 and
1963.16 It was feared not only that this wave of cases might flood the
federal courts, but also that absent unusual measures, duplication of
efforts in discovery and conflicting decisions on the same evidence
would be unavoidable.
In 1961, the Judicial Conference of the United States set up a
special panel to deal with the problem. It was named the Co-Ordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the United States
District Courts. The Committee suggested that a means of communication be established among all the judges involved in the
cases, that those judges follow the pretrial control techniques prescribed in the existing Handbook, and that procedures be devised
for avoiding repetitious discovery. Among the devices eventually
used were nationwide pretrial hearings and orders, nationwide depositions, a central information center, and a central document
center.
Having found many of these somewhat novel procedures to be
effective tools in handling the electrical equipment cases, the Committee undertook to produce the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation as a guide for judges who would have to deal with
similar cases in the future. The Manual incorporates many of the
techniques which were employed for the first time in the electrical
equipment cases, along with several procedures based upon the
Handbook.
The Manual is divided into two main parts. Part I contains pretrial and trial procedures recommended for complex or multidistrict
cases; it is divided into four main sections: Introduction; Pretrial
Procedures in Complex Civil Cases; Pretrial Procedures in Multiple
and M ultidistrict Civil Litigation; and Pretrial Procedures in Complex Criminal Cases. Part II of the Manual is an Appendix of Materials which might be useful in following the recommended procedures. The materials include suggested local court rules, sample
court orders, and extended discussions and citations of authority
on some of the points raised in Part I.
15. Id. at 355.
16. See Neal &: Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial
Administration, 50 A.B.A.J. 621 (1964); Address by Chief Justice Warren, 44th Annual
Meeting of the ALI, May 16, 1967, in 44 ALI PROC. 6-7 (1967).
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IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES

The first step in dealing with protracted litigation is to identify
the cases to which application of special procedures may ultimately
prove useful.17 The Manual recommends three means of making that
identification. All three essentially involve an attempt to canvass
everyone who might be able to identify a potentially protracted case.
The first identification device is an inspection of complaints by
the clerk of the district court. 18 To facilitate his identification of
potentially big cases, the Manual lists eleven categories into which
protracted litigation normally falls. 19 If the case falls within any of
those eleven categories, the clerk is to notify the judge assigned to
that case, the chief district judge, and the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. 20 If the case involves potential multidistrict
litigation, the chief circuit judge is to be notified as well. But the
overinclusiveness of the list, which covers practically all federalquestion civil litigation, minimizes its utility. 21 Clearly, the often
complicated procedures of the Manual should not be applied automatically to every case that comes within one of the categories
listed. 22 Thus, the procedure results only in shifting the identifica17. MANUAL § 0.2, at 9.
18. Id. § 0.23[1], at 10.
19. Id. § 0.22, at 9. The eleven categories are (I) antitrust cases; (2) cases involving a
large number of parties or an unincorporated association of large membership; (3)
cases involving requests for injunctive relief affecting the operations of a large entity;
(4) patent, copyright, and trademark cases; (5) common disaster cases; (6) individual
stockholders', stockholders' derivative, and stockholders' representative actions; (7)
products liability cases; (8) cases arising as a result of prior or pending Government
litigation; (9) multiple or multidistrict litigation; (IO) class actions or potential cJass
actions; and (11) other cases involving unusual multiplicity or complexity of factual
issues.
20. Id. § 0.23[1], at IO.
21. The categories have been specifically criticized on at least two counts. Both
actions involving a large number of parties and actions by shareholders are often class
actions handled under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 and 23.1 and are inappropriate for many of the procedures in the Manual. Moreover, both trademark and
products liability actions frequently are small and should be handled under the usual
civil procedures. See Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, Memorandum for the
ABA Special Comm. on Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, July IO, 1968, at 10-11
[hereinafter Cravath Memorandum] (Copies of the memoranda, letters, reports, and
drafts of the Manual cited in this Comment are on file in the offices of Chief Judge
"\V'illiam H. Becker, United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri,
United States Court House, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.)
22. "If the recommended procedures outlined in the Manual were followed in all
cases falling into the categories specified, both court and counsel would be unnecessarily
burdened, and interminable delays would result from unproductive adherence to the
outlined procedures." American College of Trial Lawyers, Report of Special Comm.,
May 27, 1968, at 8 [hereinafter A.C.T.L. Report]. "Automatically to invoke the
cumbersome procedure set forth in the [Manual] in relatively simple patent cases
would be like using a sledge hammer to drive a thumb tack." Letter from Stuart A.
White of Ward, McElhannon, Brooks & Fitzpatrick, New York City, to Walther E.
Wyss of Mason, Kolehemainen, Rathbum & Wyss, Chicago, June 11, 1968, at 1.
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tion burden from the clerk to the judge, for the latter must still cull
the actual complex cases from the large universe of cases within the
eleven categories. Accordingly, after notification, the judge must develop criteria for deciding which of the many cases in these categories
may prove to be complex.
The second method suggested to aid in identifying cases subject
to Manual procedures has limited usefulness, since it pertains only
to cases either based on or arising from governmental action. In
such cases, the assigned judge or the chief district judge is to contact
the appropriate governmental agencies for aid in determining
whether the case may be complex or multidistrict.23 An earlier draft
of the Manual suggested that the judge contact these governmental
agencies without consulting counsel,24 but that suggestion aroused
criticism because of the possibility that the Government's spokesman
might make statements adverse to the interests of one or more of the
litigants.25 If, for example, a representative from the Justice Department, while in the process of informing the judge that he should
anticipate private damage suits to be filed in several circuits, should
describe to that judge evidence which his office had found of pricefixing conspiracies in several parts of the country, the judge might be
prejudiced about the case he was about to hear. For this reason, the
Manual indicates that counsel should be consulted before outside
contacts are made. 26 If, after consultation, the judge decides to contact a governmental agency, he may satisfy the objections of counsel
by permitting their presence at the meeting.
The third suggested means of identifying complex or multidistrict litigation is to require each attorney who files a complaint or
an answer in a civil case to notify the clerk of the district court in
·writing of the nature and details of the case, indicating whether any
action which is or may be related to the case has been filed in any
federal or state court.27 If related actions have been filed, the attorney must provide the titles, docket numbers, and courts of all
such cases. In some circumstances, the burden imposed by this requirement would be overwhelming. For example, a litigant wishing
to recover for the ·wrongful death of a passenger in the crash of a
commercial airliner would have to search the records of every court
in the country in order to discover all the suits that had been filed
to recover for the deaths of the other passengers. Moreover, it seems
23. MANUAL § 0.23[2], at 10.
24. Proposed Draft of the Manual, May 2, 1968, at 12.
25. E.g., Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 12. See also ABA Section of
General Practice, Ad Hoc Comm. Comments on "The Manual," July 1, 1968, at 1
[hereinafter ABA Section of General Practice Memorandum].
26. MANUAL § 0.23[2], at 10.
27. Id. § 0.23[3], at 10.
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superfluous to require written notice to the clerk in every civil action filed. On the other hand, if in fact the attorney is aware of
pending related actions, it does not seem impractical to require him
to bring those cases to the attention of the court clerk. However,
the attorney's obligation of notice should include only those related
cases about which he or his client has actual knowledge. 28
Each of the Manual's suggestions has certain drawbacks. Only
two of the proposed methods are directed toward the goal of identifying complex cases-inspection of pleadings by the clerk and contact with governmental agencies. The third suggestion, attorney
identification of related cases, is designed solely to discover multidistrict litigation. Moreover, even the first two methods are limited
in their potential for identification. If the clerk's only screening
function is to determine whether newly filed cases fall into one of
the eleven categories of complex cases, it is unlikely that the potentially big cases will be discovered, since those categories are overinclusive.29 In addition; contact with the Government will help a
judge only insofar as the governmental agency has information about
the problem that spawned the litigation.
There are, however, more direct and possibly more accurate
methods that a judge might employ to decide whether a new case
warrants special treatment. For example, when the clerk has noted
that a case falls into one of the eleven categories, and when the
judge's own perusal of the papers filed indicates that the case may be
complex, the judge could contact the attorneys in the case in order
to ascertain their current views of possible issues involved and their
opinions as to the applicability of some or all of the Manual's procedures. Instead of holding a formal hearing,30 such contact could be
made effectively by telephone with less attendant cost and delay. To
overcome fears that the judge might be prejudiced through telephone contact with one party alone, and to minimize the judicial
time taken by that procedure, a "conference call" with attorneys
from both sides would be the best method of obtaining the information.
Another desirable method for identifying complex and multidistrict cases, and one that the Manual has ignored, is the use of
computers for data processing. Indeed, the portion of the Manual
28. Letter from Julian 0. von Kalinowski of Gibson, Dunn &: Crutcher, Los
Angeles, to Whitney N. Seymour of Simpson, Thatcher &: Bartlett, New York City,
July 12, 1968, at 4 [hereinafter Gibson Memorandum]; Kirkland, Ellis, Hodson,
Chaffetz &: Masters, Chicago, Memorandum for the ABA Special Comm. on Complex and
Multi-District Litigation, June 26, 1968, at 4-5 [hereinafter Kirkland Memorandum].
29. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
30. The Manual provides that at the first principal pretrial conference, the court
should ascertain the current views of counsel concerning the issues in the case. MANUAL
§ 1.2, at 20. See text accompanying notes 34-35 infra.
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dealing with identification procedures is indicative of the document's
general failure to incorporate new ideas and techniques. Although
a guidebook that is meant to be of present utility to the bench obviously cannot rely too heavily on currently impractical techniques,
the Manual has restricted itself unnecessarily to the traditional
framework of judicial administration and has ignored modern technolgy. A number of courts are now using automatic data processing
techniques to reduce their backlogs through improved scheduling,
more sophisticated statistic-gathering, and similar procedures.31 The
basic tool of those computer-assisted administrative systems is a
punch card-made when the case is filed-which contains, in coded
form, the names of the litigants and their attorneys and the issues
involved in the action. The information derived from such cards
could be electronically transferred to a Judicial Data Center, where
it could be processed for cross references to cases involving related
issues, parties, and transactions or occurrences.32 That procedure
would accomplish the task of identifying multidistrict litigation-a
task which the Manual now unrealistically assigns to each attorney.
Likewise, through statistical analysis and simulation, it would be possible to determine what factors tend to make a case complex.33 That
determination, in turn, would generate a realistic indicator of complexity to replace the clearly overinclusive categories set forth in the
Manual. While the use of computers for identification involves only
a few of the many possible applications of technological advances
to judicial administration, that use could be so beneficial that the
Manual, and those actually dealing with complex and multidistrict
cases, should not ignore it altogether.
II.

PRETRIAL PROCEDURE

The Afanual recommends that the handling of complex cases
prior to trial be done in four stages. Each stage begins with a conference which is designed to focus attention on the real issues in the
case and to refine those issues for a more speedy and effective trial.
The preliminary pretrial conference is to be held as soon as it is
apparent that the case may involve protracted litigation.34 At that
conference the judge should assume active control of the case and
ascertain the current views of all counsel on the issues. Also at this
!II. See Davidson 8: Davidson, Computerized Court Calendaring, 54 A.B.A.J. 1097
(1968).
!12. For a discussion of the use of Data Centers, see Halloran, Judicial Data Centers,
4 TRIAL 14 (Dec.-Jan. 1967-1968).
!!!I. See Navarro &: Taylor, An Application of Systems Analysis To Aid in the Efficient Administration of Justice, 51 JUDICATURE 47 (1967); Higginbotham &: Freed, The
Trial Backlog and Computer Analysis, 44 F.R.D. 104 (1967).
!14. MANUAL § 1.0, at 17.

310

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68:303

point a timetable is to be established for the filing of pleadings and
nondiscovery motions. Moreover, according to the Aianual, the
judge should fulfill several other functions at the first conference;
those functions include investigating the possibilities for consolidation of related cases, inquiring about joinder of additional parties
or the pursuance of a class action, scheduling the submission of
preliminary legal questions, considering the appointment of liaison
counsel, and urging counsel to cooperate in eliminating unnecessary
objections and motions. Finally, at this time, the judge should
schedule the "first wave" of discovery--discovery unrelated to the
merits of the case.35
The second pretrial conference is to be held after most of the
preliminary discovery has been completed and before discovery on
the merits begins.36 At this conference the court is to dispose of any
threshold questions of law, such as the permissibility of a class action
or the effect of a statute of limitations. In addition, the court should
set a time for completion of the first wave of discovery and establish
a schedule for the second wave--discovery on the merits. Finally,
the judge should explore the need for creation of document depositories, set dates prior to which discovery will not be permitted,
inquire about the possible use of expert or computer evidence, and
discuss estimated trial dates.
The third conference37 serves primarily as an opportunity for
the judge to compile final schedules for the completion of discovery,
to set dates both for the final pretrial conference and for the trial,
and to appoint a neutral expert, if one is desired. In addition, it is
the time at which counsel must file pretrial briefs, witness and exhibit lists, voir dire questions, and proposed jury instructions.
The fourth and final conference is designed to streamline the
actual trial of the case.38 At that conference, the judge should rule
on objections to offers of proof, to depositions, or to documentary
evidence, and should issue preclusion orders for matters not contained in the pretrial briefs. It is also the time for the court to appoint spokesmen or liaison counsel for trial and to set limitations
on opening statements, on the number of witnesses, and on scope of
testimony. Finally, at the fourth conference, the use of alternate
jurors or of fewer than twelve jurors and the possibility of settlement
should be discussed.
The timetable established by the Manual £or the pretrial han35. The first wave of discovery should cover the identity and location both of
witnesses and of physical- (documentary) evidence, information needed for motions on
legal defenses such as that of privilege or that of the statute of limitations, and any
discovery designed to define or narrow the ultimate issues. Id. § 1.0, at 17-18; § 1.8, at
21; § 1.5, at 22; § 1.7, at 24; § 1.8, at 25.
36. Id. § 2.0, at 28.
37. Id. § 3.0, at 58.
88. Id. § 4.0, at 75.
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clling by the court of a complex case has been criticized for its apparent rigidity. 39 Although the Manual professes to encourage
judicial flexibility and inventiveness in dealing with complex cases,
it frequently cautions against deviations from its suggestions concerning procedure and timing, on the ground that those suggestions
constitute the most effective methods that have been devised. 40 The
procedures recommended in the Manual, however, are based heavily
upon judicial experience with the electrical equipment cases,41 and
some of the procedural problems in those cases were sui generis, if
only in terms of the number of cases involved. Methods effective in
dealing with the problems in those cases are not directly applicable
to all the varied situations in which complex cases arise. Nonetheless,
it cannot be denied that judicially structured pretrial procedures are
required in big cases to avoid inefficient use of the judicial process.
When a case involves nearly a hundred parties, or when discovery
involves thousands of documents and weeks of depositions, the judge
cannot allow the attorneys to proceed with pretrial at their own
leisurely pace. Some freedom of counsel in the management of the
case, therefore, must necessarily be sacrificed.
The Manual has also been attacked for its emphasis on the establishment by the trial court of strict timetables-ones to which all
parties are expected to adhere-for pleadings, motions, and stages
of discovery.42 In the area of discovery, for example, the Manual
suggests that different waves of discovery be used, with specific
objectives to be reached in each wave before proceeding to the
next. 43 Since, in that procedure, all parties are to move simultaneously through the various stages, the court will be forced to delay
the parties who already possess the preliminary information of the
first wave44 from proceeding to discovery on the merits, until such
time as all parties have completed their preliminary discovery. 45
Although an exception may be granted when an emergency situation
exists-such as when discovery on the merits of a narrow issue may
be decisive of the case46-such variations are discouraged.47 Some
39. See A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 12-13; Cravath Memorandum, supra note
21, at 7, 15-16, 19-21.
40. MANUAL 6.
41. Id. at viii-ix. See Memorandum on Suggestions and Comments Received on
Outline 1 (prepared by the staff of the subcommittee in charge of drafting the Manual)
(hereinafter Outline Memorandum].
42. E.g., MANUAL § 1.3, at 21; § 1.5, at 22; § 2.3, at 30; § 2.7, at 57; § 3.3, at 64-68;
id. § 4.7, at 83 (days and hours of trial); id. § 3.4, at 69 (date for final pretrial conference); id. § 3.1, at 59. (time schedules).
43. Id. § 1.5, at 22; § 2.3, at 30.
44. Id. § 2.3, at 30. See note 35 supra.
45. Id. § 0.5, at 16; § 2,3, at 30.
46. Id. § 1.7, at 24.
47. Id. § 2.4, at 31.
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commentators have argued that because this procedure is so strict,
and because it requires so much involvement by the court, it is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
designed to permit great latitude and flexibility in the discovery
process by allowing discovery to be handled primarily by counsel
with a minimum of resort to the court.48 Nonetheless, while this is
true in the abstract, arguably the procedures of the Manual have
not run afoul of the discovery policy of the Federal Rules. Rather,
the Manual has attempted to achieve a reasonable accommodation
between permissible freedom and the unrestrained chaos which
could arise from lack of organization in a protracted case.
There is little doubt that schedules for discovery and for other
proceedings will serve a useful function as guidelines or target dates
for the accomplishment of the various stages of the litigation. Therefore, to the extent that the time limits are reasonable, adherence to
such schedules should be maintained. Nevertheless, the time limits
could have an unforeseen prejudicial effect in some situations, such
as when a litigant, despite a diligent effort, has been unable to locate
a certain person prior to the deadline for taking depositions on the
merits. Thus, the level of prejudice which a litigant must show to
obtain an adjustment of deadlines should not be high.49

III.

LIAISON COUNSEL

The Manual's recommendation that liaison counsel be appointed
when there are multiple parties on one or both sides of a complex
case50 has caused repeated comment from members of the bar.'11 The
Manual suggests that the court's difficulty in communicating with
multiple counsel may make it desirable for the court to request the
parties to select at pretrial one or more from their number to serve
as liaison counsel. Although the Manual contemplates that the
parties themselves stipulate the functions of such counsel, it makes
several recommendations as to what functions should be stipulated.
According to the Manual, the liaison counsel should receive notice
on behalf of all counsel when such meetings are needed for coordi48. Although this policy is not specified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it
is implicit in rules 26-37. See Letter from David J. Armstrong of Dickie, McCamey 8:
Chicote, Pittsburgh, to Cyrus V. Anderson, Associate General Counsel, PPG Industries,
Inc., Pittsburgh, May 24, 1968, at 3 [hereinafter Dickie Memorandum].
49. "Experience in the electrical cases indicates that once a lengthy schedule is
published, 'tentative' or not, it becomes diflicult to alter even for what normally would
be 'good cause shown.' Judges are reluctant to extend an early date because that
change snowballs." Kirkland Memorandum, supra note 28, at 5-6.
50. MANUAL § 1.9, at 26.
51. See, e.g., Co-Ordinating Comm. on Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, Special
Meeting on Recommended Changes in the Proposed Manual for Complex and Multiple
Litigation, San Francisco, July 24, 1968, at 45 (remarks of Don H. Jackson of Jackson,
Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, Mo.) [hereinafter Special Meeting].
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nating discovery, for agreeing upon responses to questions and suggestions of the court, or for initiating proposals, suggestions,
proposed orders, and proposed schedules during pretrial proceedings.
During the trial, the liaison counsel should be authorized to act on
minor procedural matters without specific prior consultation. 52 Objections made by him may be relied on by any other party without
repetition.
The Manual states that in the event that the parties are not able
to agree upon who should act as liaison counsel, the court has the
power to make the appointment."53 The source of that power is
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), which permits the court to
"make such orders . . . as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay." The few courts that have appointed liaison counsel, however,
have viewed the action as an extraordinary measure which should
be taken only under compelling circumstances and not when more
conventional remedies are available. 54 In addition, the court-appointed general counsel in those cases was not intended to be either
a substitute for the counsel of each party or a court-appointed master
of litigation. Rather, his function was to supervise and coordinate
the activities of the other attorneys; each attorney was still free to
present his own case, to examine witnesses if he wished, and to open
and close before the jury. Furthermore, the burden was placed upon
the party seeking the appointment of a liaison counsel to show sufficient justification for such an appointment. 55 In any event, the
appointment of a liaison counsel lies within the discretion of the
judge. If opportunity does exist for conserving substantial amounts
of time and expense, appointment should be made unless prejudice
to a litigant's case would result.
It seems to be generally accepted that the use of liaison counsel
may in many instances be an extremely useful device which may result in the conservation of both time and money for all parties involved. 56 For example, in many cases, briefs on the primary issues
may be combined to avoid needless repetition of substantially the
same points. Likewise, questioning of witnesses at trial may often be
52. MANUAL § 4.8, at 84. A principal examining counsel for each side during trial
is also recommended. Presumably, however, that does not preclude other counsel from
making additional objections and responses.
53. MANUAL § 1.9, at 26 n.27. However, the Manual states that caution should be
observed in appointing liaison counsel over the objection of one or more parties.
54. MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958); see Rando v. Luckenback
Steamship Co., 25 F.R.D. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). The MacAlister court suggested that the
use of a single judge (see note 166 infra and accompanying text) may obviate the need
for liaison counsel.
55. MacAiister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1958).
56. See Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 4. That consensus is absent, how•
ever, when the parties' interests differ. In such instances, no appointment of liaison
counsel should be made.
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handled by one or two counsel from the group in order not to antagonize the judge or the jury by subjecting them to tedious, repetitive examinations. 157
One concern that has been expressed over the Manual's recommendation is that a liaison counsel may be appointed to represent
litigants whose interests are related but not identical.58 The Manual
has responded to that problem by stating that many conditions,
including conflicts of interest and of legal theories, may make it
undesirable to compel the delegation of authority to a single representative counsel.59 But when minor conflicts do exist, it may be
possible for the court to select several liaison counsel--one representative of each position. In a large shareholders' derivative suit,
for instance, it might be best to appoint one liaison counsel to represent the holders of each class of securities. By doing so, each major
interest group would have representation, but some measure of the
efficiency gained by dealing with a relatively small number of counsel would be preserved.
Another objection to the use of liaison counsel is that, even
when the parties' interests are virtually identical, counsel will often
wish to use differing litigation strategies or legal arguments. 60 There
is also a fear that disparities in tactical abilities between the liaison
counsel and the various other counsel might adversely affect the
position of those parties whose counsel do not serve as liaison. The
answer to these objections is that the liaison counsel's primary
function is to serve as a coordinator between the court and the many
parties, not to exercise binding authority on behalf of the coparties.
What representative authority he does possess is limited to procedural matters unless the parties agree that he should have such
authority for other purposes. In that light, then, it does not seem
overly harsh to permit liaison counsel to fix the dates for pretrial
hearings or to commit others to a discovery timetable. It is true, however, that procedural decisions sometimes will have a direct effect
on the substance of a case. Accordingly, if a party is able to show
that possible material prejudice to his case has arisen from the actions of a liaison couns~l, he should be granted relief. For example,
if liaison counsel's deposition of a witness has been incomplete,
another counsel, upon showing potential material prejudice, should
be afforded the opportunity to depose the same witness. Of course,
continual objections and the resultant hearings to show prejudice
would cause delay and would perhaps negate the intended benefits
of the use of liaison counsel. Therefore, the authority granted to
57. See Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 17.
58. Id. at 18.
59. MANUAL § 1.9, at 26.
60. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 18.
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the liaison counsel should, at the outset, be carefully delineated and
limited so as to exclude the power to bind the litigants on matters
of substance and thus to preclude frequent objection. 61
The necessity of compensating liaison counsel for the time he
spends discharging representative functions raises another problem.
Parties may well be reluctant to permit their attorneys to serve as
representatives when there is little chance that they will recover the
additional expenses involved. 62 In fact, some litigants simply may
not be able to bear the burden of paying their attorneys for the
added time required to carry out the duties of liaison counsel.63
There are various possible solutions to this problem. In Rando v.
Luckenbach Steamship Company, 64 cited by the Manual as authority
for the court to appoint liaison counsel on its mvn motion, the appointment was made upon agreement of counsel to serve in a liaison
capacity without additional compensation. Absent such agreement,
the costs could be allocated in relation to the benefit derived. Thus,
if a party has been spared the time and expense of repeated production of documents, that should be reflected in a partial payment of
fees by him to the liaison counsel. In addition, the expenses saved
by attorneys for the other parties could be used to offset any increased cost of having a representative attorney. However, because
the potential savings resulting from the use of liaison counsel could
be greater than the added expenses, and because the allocation described above may be difficult and time-consuming, perhaps the best
solution is to have all parties being represented by a particular liaison attorney agree to divide his expenses equally.
IV.

DOCUMENT DEPOSITORIES

A procedure recommended by the Manual and used quite extensively during the course of the electrical equipment cases is the
establishment of document depositories. 611 The purpose of such depositories is to eliminate the duplication of discovery efforts which
arises when many parties are seeking discovery of the same material.
For instance, if several plaintiffs alleging a price fixing conspiracy
seek to discover the correspondence of marketing executives in each
defendant company, all of the requested documents normally would
have to be duplicated several times or the files of each company
61. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 14.
62. E.g., Letter from Theodore W. Anderson, Jr., of Pendleton, Neuman, Seibold
&: Williams, Chicago, to Walther E. Wyss of Mason, Kolehmainen, Rathbum &: Wyss,
Chicago, June 14, 1968, at 8 [hereinafter Pendleton Memorandum].
63. See Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 17.
64. 25 F.R.D. 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
65. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32; see Baldridge, Problems Raised in Multiple Litigation,
11 ANTITRusr Buu.. 635, 638 (1966).
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opened repeatedly in order to permit inspection. When the number
of plaintiffs is in the hundreds, as in the electrical equipment cases,
the duplication can run to over a million documents and the hours
devoted to inspection of the files may exceed several thousand. If
each plaintiff must travel to each plant of every company to inspect
the files, the time and expense involved in discovery can be very
great. By setting up centralized depositories for such documents,
the burden and expense of document discovery is minimized. Hours
for inspection under the supervision of defendant's agents can be arranged without burdening the normal operations of the party being
discovered. Moreover, expenses of travelling to the central depository
will be, in most instances, substantially less than would be incurred
otherwise.
The Manual extolls the use of document depositories as "a major
step fonvard in the orderly, efficient and economical processing of
the complex case.'' 66 Some members of the bar, however, argue that
depositories will often not be profitable and should be employed
only in unusual circumstances. 67 The basic criticism of depositories
is directed at the time and expense involved in their maintenance.68
The Manual appears to meet that criticism by recommending that
this procedure be used only when depositing documents at one or
more convenient locations will result in reduced expenses, time, and
effort. 611 The determination as to the propriety of establishing depositories is to be made by the judge after consultation with counsel.
In that determination, problems concerning available space, hours
of access, and custodial expense should be considered; 70 but they are
only some of the factors to be weighed in exploring the feasibility
of using a depository and should not be determinative. Certainly in
many cases, such as massive multidistrict litigation, the use of depositories will prove to be the most efficient means for implementing
discovery. In a close case, the interest of the party undergoing discovery in the continued smooth operation of his business, free from
the excessive burden of repetitive discovery, should militate in favor
of the central depository.
The Manual suggests that control of the depository may be either
retained by the parties or taken by the court.71 The suggestion that
66. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32.
67. See, e.g., A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 15; Cravath Memorandum, supra
note 21, at 21-22. "[T]he overwhelming consensus is that depositories should only be
used under extraordinary circumstances. Unless so used, document depositories are
too expensive and time-consuming to maintain." Outline Memorandum, supra note
41, at 5.
68. Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 5.
69. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32.
70. A.C.T L. Report, supra note 22, at 15.
71. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32.
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the court can maintain control of the depository has been criticised
on the ground that it will encourage the court to move outside the
area of its permissible functions. 72 According to that criticism, the
court's control will force it to be in continual, intimate contact with
the materials produced for discovery, and will thereby prompt it to
determine on its own initiative what documents have or have not
been produced and to compel compliance with discovery orders.
Performing such functions, it is argued, is the obligation of opposing
counsel, rather than of the court; and, in any event, is incompatible
with the goal of efficient judicial administration.73 That argument,
however, is not convincing. Indeed, it is quite consistent with the
goal of efficient judicial administration for the court to take steps
to ensure compliance with court orders. Such affirmative action may
obviate the need for in-court skirmishes initiated by the parties over
refusals to produce ordered documents. There is some validity to
the argument that the court should not be exposed needlessly to
documents which may or may not be later offered in evidence.74 But
judges are constantly required to rule on the admissibility of evidence in nonjury cases, and thus are presumably able, in arriving
at their decisions on the merits, to recognize the inadmissible material that they have seen and to give it no weight. It also is unlikely
that the judge will assume direct personal control over the depository; probably he will in practice assign that function to clerical
personnel.
There are several ways, according to the Manual, in which
the utility of document depositories could be increased. For example, the use of a master would eliminate much of the administrative burden that would otherwise be on the judge.75 Categorization and summarization of the materials submitted to the depository
are only two of the many functions that a master could perform.
Similarly, depositories may be made even more functional if the
techniques of electronic data processing are employed to ease the
very large discovery burden which exists in cases producing thousands of pages of discoverable matter.76
The expense of maintaining a depository is to be borne by the
party who controls the depository and who benefits from not having
to make multiple production of the same documents.77 A strong
72, A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 15.
73. "If orders are not complied with, opposing counsel, who after all is expected
to inspect documents produced at his request no matter where located, has every
opportunity to make a motion pursuant to [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 37."
Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 21-22.
74. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 15.
75. See text accompanying notes 78-95 infra.
76. See note 99 infra.
77. MANUAL § 2.5, at 32,
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argument can be made, however, that when several parties are contributing to a single depository, the persons conducting discovery
realize substantial savings by not having to travel to many separate
depositories and should therefore share in the depository expense.
The Manual makes no mention of who should bear the expense of
a court-controlled depository; presumably the cost should be allocated, as nearly as possible, in proportion to the estimated savings
to each party.
V.

APPOINTMENT OF MASTERS

The Manual deals rather extensively with the advisability of appointing a master to perform special functions in connection with a
complex case. Suggested functions include supervision of the
discovery process, fact-finding on preliminary motions, and the performance of complicated accounting.78 The Manual's remarks concerning the employment of this procedure, however, are very
cautionary. Appointment of a master is to be reserved for exceptional cases and is then to be made only after discussion with the
counsel of all parties.79 If a reference is made, the court is advised
to meet shortly thereafter with the master in an informal conference
to discuss possible problems. The Manual advises that frequent contact be maintained between the judge and the master and that
further pretrial conferences concerning the master's activities be held
if necessary.
The apparent hesitancy with which the Manual approaches the
use of masters seems to stem from the statement in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53(b), that "reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule," and from the United States Supreme
Court's decision in La Buy v. Howes Leather Company, 80 interpreting that language strictly. In La Buy, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had issued a writ of mandamus to a district judge
to vacate an order referring an antitrust suit to a master. The court
of appeals held that the congestion of the trial calendar and the complexity of the issues did not constitute the exceptional conditions
that under rule 53 may alone justify reference of a nonjury case in
its entirety.81 The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the court
of appeals, noting that if court congestion were in itself sufficient
to warrant reference, the use of masters in some populous districts
78. Id. § 3.2, at 60-63. It is the broad consensus of opinion that the use of masters
to supervise discovery should be made only in exceptional cases in which there is a
compelling showing of need. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 13; Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 6.
·
79. See MANUAL § 3.22, at 62; Kirkland Memorandum, supra note 28, at 6.
80. 352 U .s. 249, 256 (1957).
81. 226 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1955).
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would become the rule rather than the exception. The Court's attitude was further reflected in the statement that masters were not to
"displace the court," but were to be used only to assist the judge in
specific duties. 82
The La Buy decision makes it clear that reference of a case in
its entirety should be extremely rare. 83 When the master's duties are
limited in scope, however, the standard of exceptional circumstances
has been somewhat relaxed. 84 It has been suggested that when a
master is appointed to supervise the pretrial discovery in a complex
case which in other respects remains under the general direction of
the trial judge, the reference is sufficiently limited in scope so that
the rule of La Buy is inapplicable.85 Indeed, when reference is limited to big cases, the "exception not the rule" policy of rule 53 is
preserved; and when the scope of the referral is confined to supervising discovery, there is only a minor usurpation of the judicial
function. Nevertheless, the Manual has apparently adopted the narrower position reflected in La Buy.
.
Even assuming that federal law permits the pretrial handling
of a complex case to be referred to a master, that referral procedure,
as the Manual has noted, is subject to several objections. One is that
the judge will not familiarize himself with the case during its pretrial phase as completely as he would have if he had personally supervised discovery, and that, therefore, he will be less competent and
efficient in deciding pretrial motions and in trying the case.86 That
criticism, however, is valid only if, as the Manual suggests, a single
judge is assigned to the complex case for all purposes.87 If so, it may
be true that proper attention during pretrial proceedings will result
in a more effective trial. But it is arguable that subjecting the trial
judge to a mass of raw evidentiary material rather than to digested
compilations of the same material could cloud his over-all understanding of the evidence and result in a less organized trial. Moreover, when a case is sufficiently complex to warrant the use of a
master, the greater importance of other uses of the judge's time
would seem to justify a referral. In one large case, for example,
there were over 100,000 pages of depositions, 173 witnesses, and
45,000 documents the combined pages of which totaled 700,000.
The master supervising discovery in that case spent more than
82. 352 U.S. at 256.
83. 352 U.S. at 256-60. See 2B w. BARRON &: A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcrICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1162 (C. Wright ed. 1961, Supp. 1968).
84. See Note, Reference of the Big Case Under Federal Rule 5!J(b): A New Meaning for the "Exceptional Condition" Standard, 65 YALE L.J. 1057, 1065 (1956).
85. Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REY. 452, 465
(1958).
86. MANUAL § 3.22, at 62.
87. Id. § 0.ll, at 12.
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twenty hours a week in hearings for a period of 350 days. 88 In such
a situation, it would be a prodigious waste of judicial manpower
for a judge to devote that much time to discovery hearings in one
case. Certainly, much more productive use can be made of his time
in disposing of the trial backlog existing in most courts. Moreover,
allowing a master to sift through the documents would help to
prevent the judge from being prejudiced by arguably inadmissible
evidence.89
Another major limitation on the employment of masters arises
from the likelihood that reference will add appreciably to the cost
of litigation.1i 0 While judicial supervision of discovery is provided
at public expense, the master's compensation as well as other costs
of reference are charged to the litigants. That factor is especially
significant when the litigants have unequal economic resources. If,
in such circumstances, the costs of an impending reference are too
great, the poorer litigant may be compelled to acquiesce in an otherwise unacceptable settlement.1l1 Thus, it is questionable whether the
cost of conserving judicial manpower should be allocated entirely
to the few litigants whose disputes are expected to require lengthy
trials.1i 2
It is quite possible, moreover, that reference to a master would
actually protract the litigation.1!3 A master appointed by the court
may be able to devote only a limited amount of time to the referred
case. In addition, repeated resort to the court to obtain decisions
concerning disputes over rulings of the master and court hearings to
determine whether the conclusions of the master are to be accepted,
may tend to prolong the case.1l4 The Manual attempts to deal with
that problem by recommending that the delegation of authority to
the master be explicitly defined and that the judge avoid substituting
his judgment for that of the master in a decision which does not
involve legal error. Those recommendations, if carried out, should
discourage unnecessary requests for review of the master's evidentiary
rulings, and should minimize the extent to which factual disputes
88. Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., Civil No. 44-482 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 1, 1948);
see Kaufman, supra note 85, at 466.
89. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
90. See, e.g., Dickie Memorandum, supra note 48, at 5. See also Lyman v. Remington Rand, Inc., 188 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1951) ($100,000); Robertshaw-Fulton Control Co.
v. Patrol Valve Co., 106 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ($18,000).
91. See Note, supra note 84, at 1061.
92. Id. at 1062. It does not seem inappropriate to suggest that when judges and
masters serve the same function, and the latter is chosen in order to conserve the
farmer's time, the public should bear the expense of the master's employment.
93. Id. at 1062.
94. See Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 24.
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resolved by the master are reopened in a judicial review of his
findings. 95
In general, then, although a court should not lightly order a
referral, it seems clear that when the evidence on an issue involves
a mass of undigested technical data, of complex scientific testimony,
or of raw figures and elaborate computations, such an issue is
particularly suited for the abilities of a special master. The master
can distill the confusing mass of evidence and can present to the
fact finder, with brevity and precision, the questions to be resolved.
Thus, as long as the litigants are not deprived of a judicial determination of the issues of law, and, as long as the costs are not prohibitive
to a party, reference to a master should be made whenever conservation of time would result.
VI.

PROOF OF COMPLEX FACTS

Significant gains in clarity and efficiency can be achieved in many
complex cases by using automated processing techniques to prove
facts which require the manipulation of a great bulk of underlying
data.96 Accordingly, a large segment of the Manual has been devoted
to a comprehensive discussion of computer samples, polls, and survey
evidence.97 The Manual makes several basic recommendations concerning the use of such techniques. Voluminous or complicated data
should, if possible, be presented at trial in a summarized form, such
as a chart, graph, or extract.98 By thus eliminating both the introduction into evidence of volumes of raw data and the resultant in-court
objections to it, substantial savings of trial time will result. The
supporting raw data, however, must be made available to opposing
counsel sufficiently in advance of trial to permit objections to be
raised to the admissibility of the summarized data. In addition, the
methods of interpretation and summarization which were used, as
well as the conclusions drawn, should be made available in advance
95. MANUAL § 3.22, at 63.
96. For an example both of the unreasonable size of the materials presented to
the court in these cases and the techniques for using electronic devices for indexing
and arranging those materials, see Freed, Improved Information Processing in the
Conduct of Large '}:rials, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAw 72 (R. Bigelow ed. 1966); Brown,
Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind: Computing the Data Computer's Collision with
Law, 71 YALE L.J. 239 (1961).
97. Special Meeting, supra note 51, at 78-91 (remarks of Professor Arthur R. Miller
of the Univ. of Michigan Law School).
98. MANUAL § 2.611, at !16. For a detailed example of how to set up and use computer data in the trial of a complex case, see Freed, Machine Data Processing Systems
for the Trial Lawyer, 6 PRAc. LAw. 73, 78-96 (April 1960); Lozowick, Steiner &: Miller,
Law and Quantitative Multivariate Analysis: An Encounter, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1641,
1674-78 (1968).
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of trial. 99 That procedure will frequently permit decisions on the
admissibility of the summarizations to be made prior to trial. Moreover, by submitting the research design or a presampling before the
full-scale data gathering and tabulation is undertaken, it may be
possible to correct or to eliminate legal and practical flaws in the
mechanics of a proposed survey before a major research investment
is made.100
The Manual takes the position that polls and surveys should be
encouraged whenever the tests of trustworthiness and necessity are
met. 101 The trustworthiness of survey evidence depends mainly on
whether the techniques employed in conducting the survey are within
accepted principles of survey research. 102 The necessity for the use
of samples or polls depends upon whether proof by other methods
is shown to be impractical. The more subjective the data to be
surveyed, that is, the more it is based on beliefs or opinions, the
higher the standard of necessity should be. 103 The Manual therefore
suggests that the court inquire as to how the parties intend to use
such evidence.104 That inquiry is to be made early in the pretrial
process so that the court may issue appropriate pretrial orders concerning both the discovery and the proposed use at trial of electronically derived material. Subsequently, at the third principal
pretrial conference, the court, having previously inquired as to the
possible use of computer runs, should require divulgence of the raw
data, of the method or program which has been employed in summarizing or evaluating the data, and of all the results derived, both
favorable and unfavorable.105 The last requirement has met with
some opposition. It is argued that required disclosure of unfavorable
results will discourage experimentation in the use of data processing
to gather evidence-an objective the Manual clearly intends to
advance.106 According to that argument, in many areas in which
computer evidence may be useful, certain basic hypotheses upon
99. MANUAL § 2.613, at 43.
100. It is important to realize that survey results are neutral; only the conclusions
drawn from them favor a particular side. Therefore both parties can cooperate to set
up the survey. Early, The Use of Survey Evidence in Antitrust Proceedings, 33 WASH.
L. REv. 380, 397 (1958).
101. MANUAL § 2.612, at 37-42.
102. See Zeisel, The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 339
(1960).
103. See generally Sorenson 8e Sorenson, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion
Research Evidence, 28 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1213 (1953); "Wheaton, What Is Rearsay1, 46
IOWA L. REv. 210, 218 (1960).
104. MANUAL § 2.6, at 33.
105. Id. § 3.52, at 72. For an evaluation of differing results and the means to
handle the problem, see Sorenson 8e Sorenson, supra note 103, at 1240-57.
106. A.C.T L. Report, supra note 22, at 16; Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21,
at 25,
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which the ultimate survey is to be based must be chosen by trial and
error. If unfavorable conclusions based on false hypotheses must be
disclosed in discovery, those conclusions can be subsequently used
by the opposition to discredit, perhaps unduly, the program eventually employed. Accordingly, inhibitions against utilizing survey
evidence will naturally result.107 While that criticism is valid, it may
be argued in defense of the Manual's position that if more than one
answer is possible, that factor itself is relevant to the validity of the
results actually used and should be discoverable and thus made
available to the trier of fact. If the original hypothesis is actually mistaken, that fact can be explained in direct examination. Furthermore, disclosure of conflicting results may be the best way to remove
any notion that the conclusions are an infallible scientific determination.1os
By its extended and favorable discussion of the evidentiary value
of data processing, the Manual has taken bold steps into an area
where courts for too long have neglected to venture. Perhaps the
Manual may provide the impetus needed to move reluctant judges
to use technologically complex, but extremely valuable electronic
and computer-formulated evidence.

VII.

COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS

The Manual recommends that upon completion of discovery,
and prior to the final pretrial conference, the court should consider
appointing its own expert.109 That procedure is to be employed when
the experts presented by the parties have expressed irreconcilable
opinions on important issues in the case,110 for it is thought to be
unwise to require a lay trier of fact to resolve conflicts of complex
opinions without the benefit of hearing an expert chosen by the
court.m If the irreconcilable views are a function of divergent factual
107. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 16.
108. See Sorenson &: Sorenson, supra note 103, at 1221; Zeise!, supra note 102, at
344.
109. MANUAL § 3.51, at 70.
ll0. At the third principal pretrial conference, the parties are to submit, along
with their final pretrial brief, written offers of proof including summarization of the
opinions of their experts. Id. § 3.3, at 64-68. The Manual also contemplates the use
of preclusion orders to prevent the raising of any factual matter not included in the
final brief. See text accompanying notes 130-38 infra. The Manual urges early disclosure of the contents of the proposed testimony of the experts. However, "1,mless
postponed to a date when discovery has been completed, [such a procedure] works a
hardship on the parties. Proper preparation of an expert cannot be completed early
in the discovery stage. Any early summary will, of necessity, not be very meaningful."
Kirkland Memorandum, supra note 28, at 8.
111. See Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1080
(1966); Prettyman, Proof of Scientific and Technical Facts, 21 F.R.D. 466 (1957);
Whinery, Court Experts and the Proof of Scientific Fact-An Experiment in Law
Reform, 23 F.R.D. 481 (1958).
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assumptions rather than a result of different underlying theories, the
court is to determine whether the resolution of the factual issues is
within the competence of the trier of fact. If not, appointment of a
court expert may be indicated. When the dispute concerns the proper
theoretical approach to the evidence, the judge is to acquaint himself
with the well-recognized schools of thought in the field, in order to
determine whether it would be worthwhile to present experts with
viewpoints not presented by the parties.112
The problems raised by the court appointment of an expert
depend upon how the expert is to be used. In general he may be
employed either to interpret evidence which has been introduced by
the parties or to present additional evidence.113 While both functions
present serious problems, it is the second which has caused the
expert section to evoke stronger criticism than has been directed
toward any other part of the Manual. 114 It is argued that the court
has abandoned its traditional role of neutrality and, by employing
its own experts to produce additional evidence, has donned the
cloak of an advocate.115 The proponents of that position admit that
the court still has no interest in the outcome of the case; but
they argue that, by searching out a representative of a school of
thought not explored or presented by the parties, and by permitting
him to produce new evidence or to render new opinions, the court
has initiated an action that could substantially affect the outcome of
the litigation by aiding or injuring some litigant. In an adversary
system, the risk of nonpersuasion normally falls upon the litigants;
and if the burden imposed upon a party is not met, the party cannot
prevail.116 That burden, critics· feel, should not be made lighter or
heavier by the introduction of testimony which originates with the
court.
The criticism of the Manual's proposal appears to have much
merit. Once the court-appointed expert testifies, it would be difficult,
if not impossible, for a jury to avoid the conclusion that the parties'
experts are unduly biased and that their testimony is therefore
deserving of little weight.117 Similarly, in a nonjury case, the judge
112. Some lawyers contend that an impartial expert cannot have the knowledge
and experience of the parties' experts and that therefore the information needed by
the judge should be obtained in conference with the parties' experts and lawyers.
See, e.g., Andrus, The Court Appointed Expert, 23 F.R.D. 519 (1958).
113. See Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge To Call His Own Expert
Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REv. 195, 211-13 (1956).
114. See Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at 6-8; Special Meeting, supra note
51, at 55-58 (remarl<s of Don H. Jackson of Jackson, Barker 8: Sherman, Kansas City,
Mo.).
115. See Dickie Memorandum, supra note 48, at 4.
116. Sink, supra note 113, at 212.
117. A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 21. The parties would naturally have the
opportunity to cross-examine and to rebut the testimony of the court's expert. See Coleman, Use of Inter-Parties Neutral Witnesses in Patent Cases, 21 F.R.D. 548, 550 (1957).
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may have greater respect for the expert he has appointed. Indeed,
with the appearance of a court-appointed expert, there is a very
strong possibility that the fact finder may give almost conclusive
weight to that expert's testimony, because it was produced by judicial
intervention, and therefore implicitly approved by the court.118 The
Manual has attempted to respond to that criticism by providing that,
in a jury case, an appropriate cautionary instruction be given in
order to prevent the jury from ascribing undue weight to an expert's
testimony solely because of his court appointment.119 But such instruction, while better than no guidance at all, does not seem to be
a sufficiently strong repudiation to prevent the "court-expert" from
becoming in fact the ultimate juror.120
In an earlier draft of the Manual, it was stated that a court-appointed expert need not be available for deposition by the parties,
and that the data upon which his opinion was based was not required
to be made accessible to the parties.121 The Manual now provides
that the expert's data must be available to the parties and that his
deposition may be taken; 122 but before deposing the court-appointed
expert, the party must obtain permission from the court. 123 That requirement of obtaining permission suggests that the court's expert
is still not to be as freely accessible as are the litigants' experts, who
may be deposed as a matter of right.124 Surely, however, if the court
is permitted to select an additional expert, it is not unreasonable for
the parties to be able to depose him on the same basis as other witnesses.1211 In the Appendix of Materials related to this portion of the
Manual, it is even suggested that the expert need not be made available at trial, but can advise the court "in camera."126 That proposal
has elicited strenuous objection on the ground that it denies the
parties not only the right to cross-examine, but also the right to
know the content of the information conveyed to the trier of fact
during out-of-court sessions. 127
In light of the serious problems created by the use of court118. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 35.
119. MANUAL § 3.51, at 70-71.
120. See Special Meeting, supra note 51, at 56 (remarks of Don H. Jackson of Jackson, Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, Mo.). See also Note, The New York Medical
Expert Project: An Experiment in Securing Impartial Testimony, 63 YALE L.J. 1023,
1029 n.39 (1954) (remarks of I. Halpern, Attorney, New York City).
121. Proposed Draft of the Manual, May 2, 1968, at 37.
122. MANUAL § 3.51, at 71.
123. Id.
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a), 30(a), 3I(a).
125. See Letter from Don M. Jackson of Jackson, Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City,
Mo., to Cyrus V. Anderson, Associate General Counsel of PPG Industries, Inc., Pittsburg, July I, 1968, at 4 [hereinafter Jackson Memorandum].
126. MANUAL, APPENDIX § 3.5l(f), at 277.
127. Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 5.
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appointed experts, it is fortunate that the Manual indicates that
such an appointment should be the exception rather than the
rule. 128 Indeed, commentators on the Manual have suggested that
this procedure should be employed only with the consent of counsel.129 That strict limitation seems especially appropriate for jury
trials when a cautionary instruction may be of limited effect.
VIII.

PRECLUSION ORDERS

In an effort to streamline the trial process in complex cases, the
Manual recommends the use of orders which prohibit the parties
from offering into evidence or othenvise raising any legal or factual
matters not included in their final pretrial briefs unless they can
show "good cause" for doing so. 130 However, requiring a litigant to
show good cause for admitting additional evidence-that is, that a
refusal to admit new matter at trial could prejudice his case-may be
inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). That rule
provides that if the admission of evidence is objected to at trial on
the ground that it is not within the issues formed by the pleadings,
the court should allow the pleadings to be amended, and should do
so freely as long as the presentation of the merits will be furthered
and as long as the objecting party fails to show that the admission
will be prejudicial to his action or defense. Thus, preclusion of
additional evidence except upon a showing of good cause appears to
be contrary to the federal policy of liberal admission of evidence.131
It can be argued, however, that rule 15(b) was intended to deal with
the "average" case, such as a personal injury suit. In such cases, hurried preparation often raises the likelihood that new evidence will
come to light or that a change in legal theory will be necessary subsequent to any cursory pretrial attempt to frame the issues or to limit
the evidence. But in a complex suit, when several pretrial conferences are held in order to define the issues, and when all parties
are aware of the evidence that has been discovered and is to be
introduced, rule 15(b)'s objective of attempting to insure that the
merits of the case are fully heard will be satisfied even if preclusion
orders are allowed. Admittedly, the Manual has placed the burden
of demonstrating prejudice upon the counsel who is seeking to offer
the new evidence rather than upon the party objecting to its introduction, as contemplated by rule 15(b).132 Yet, if the purpose of
128. MANUAL § 3.51, at 70.
129. Pendleton Memorandum, supra note 62, at 9; Kirkland Memorandum, supra
note 28, at 6.
130. MANUAL § 1.4, at 21; § 2.4, at 31.
131. See Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 3; ABA Section of General
Practice Memorandum, supra note 25, at 2.
132. See text following note 130 supra.
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the rule has been otherwise fulfilled, then the use of preclusion
orders to avoid delay and disorder at trial is in the interest of justice.
Any conflict that still remains with the spirit of rule 15(b) can be
eliminated by admitting precluded evidence whenever a relatively
low level of good cause has been shown.
An earlier draft of the Manual stated not only that showing good
cause was necessary before new evidence could be admitted, but also
that "except in rare instances" preclusion orders should be issued
after the submission of pretrial briefs.133 Critics contended that the
l\fanual erred in recommending that preclusion orders be used "except in rare instances." 134 They argued that, regardless of the degree
of care exercised in discovery and in preparation for trial, the legal
and factual issues involved in a complex case defy total mastery by
the parties. It was therefore felt to be unreasonably harsh automatically to preclude litigants from introducing facts or legal theories
which were discovered after the final pretrial conference.135 It was
likewise contended that unpredictable developments during the trial
might make it necessary to offer additional evidence.136 It is not
clear, however, whether the phrase, "except in rare instances,"
was deleted in response to that criticism, nor what the present
standard of using preclusion orders is. If the final version of the
Manual contemplates a strict interpretation of "good cause" so that
preclusion orders will be used extensively, the critics' arguments are
still viable. But those arguments are not totally convincing today.
The present Manual does not require that final pretrial briefs be
submitted until after £ull discovery on the merits, and then only a
short time prior to trial. 137 In a complex antitrust or product liability
case involving several parties and large damage claims, it seems likely
that legal theories will be formulated well in advance of the final
pretrial conference. Since most complex cases remain in the pretrial
stage for two to three years, it does not appear unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation by trial counsel during that period. Moreover,
if unanticipated contingencies do arise, the judge may, upon a showing of good cause, disregard his own preclusion order as long as the
new evidence will not cause material prejudice to the party against
whom that evidence is to be used.138 The requirement of showing
good cause seems to be a small burden when contrasted with the possible advantages that can result from limiting the introduction of
evidence at trial to that evidence which is sufficiently important to
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138,

Proposed Draft of the Manual, May 2, 1968, at 34.
A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 19.
Id.
Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 3.
MANUAL § 3.3, at 64.
MANUAL § 4.2, at 76.
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be included in the final pretrial brief. Of course, it is arguable that
using preclusion orders in this way will impel each litigant to include every remotely important matter in his brief, thus circumventing the thrust of the preclusion order. But it seems unlikely that an
attorney would weaken the effect of his pretrial brief by including
obscure matters in it, in an effort to avoid a preclusion order which
could be overcome by a showing of good cause.

IX.

MULTIPLE AND MULTIDISTRIGr LITIGATION

The basic object of the Manual's recommendation on multiple
and multidistrict litigation is to promote consolidation of cases which
contain one or more common questions of fact, whenever such consolidation will eliminate repetitious litigation. 139 Once consolidation
has been accomplished, the previously discussed procedures for complex cases are to be used. 140 When the identification process has
located a group of related cases, the court is to investigate the possibilities of using a class action, rather than consolidation, to avoid multiple litigation. 141 A class action is a simpler and a more efficient means
of combining related cases than is consolidation, and should therefore be used whenever possible. The litanual cautions, however, that
courts must be careful to avoid entering parallel orders for the maintenance of actions based on the compulsory provisions of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 142 If such orders should be entered,
resolution can be achieved only at the appellate level. The Manual
suggests ttvo methods of protecting against that occurrence: 143 that
informal contacts be made among the judges involved in related actions which are potentially class actions; and that the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, recently established by Congress, 144 exercise general supervision of the pretrial proceedings in all potentially multidistrict class actions.
If a class action is inappropriate, the Manual states, the related
suits should be consolidated. Since the problems of consolidation
vary, the Manual deals with a variety of possible situations. The
simplest situation involves related cases pending in one division of
139. The feeling of the Co-Ordinating Committee on this point was reflected in the
statement of Judge Becker that "consolidated treatment of common issues in multi•
district litigation has in nearly all cases resulted in decreased costs to all concerned,
even after traveling expenses are considered." Judge William H. Becker, Memorandum
on Professor Miller's Suggestions to Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah, May 3, 1968, at 6.
[hereinafter Becker Memorandum].
140. MANUAL § 5.13, at 89.
141. Id. § 5.5, at 99-100.
142. Id.; see Fm. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(l)·(2).
143. MANUAL § 5.5, at 99-100.
144. That panel was created in 1968 by the passage of Pub. L. 90-296 (April 29,
1968), 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See notes 160-69 infra and accompanying
text.
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a single district. 145 The Manual recommends that, in those circumstances, a single judge be assigned to all of the related cases in order
to gain the advantages of centralized management. Once that assignment is made, the judge can order consolidation of the cases
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a). If, however,
there is a possibility of prejudice to a party's case through consolidation with several other cases or for any other reason, the judge
may order the cases combined solely for limited purposes. 146
If the related cases are pending in several divisions of a single
district, consolidation becomes more complex. 147 The Manual states
that authority to transfer all such cases to a single division is given
by section 1404(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code. 148 If that
interpretation of section I 404(b) is correct, transfer of the cases to
a single division would permit the application of the consolidation
procedure outlined above. The statute, however, provides that
transfer is permissible "[u]pon motion, consent or stipulation of all
parties .... " 149 But, despite that language, the Manual contends that,
while obtaining consent or stipulation of all parties is desirable,
transfer can be made upon the initiative of the court, even over the
objection of a party.
Even more complex problems arise when related cases are pending in two or more districts of a single circuit.150 The first step in
that instance is to transfer the cases in each district to a single division, pursuant to section 1404(b).151 With that accomplished, the
1\Ianual states, four possible courses of action are then available: 152
(I) to coordinate pretrial proceedings through the judges of the
separate districts; (2) to transfer all cases within the circuit to a
single district pursuant to section 1404(a) of title 28; 153 (3) to assign one judge to all related cases in the various districts; or (4) to
consolidate all cases for pretrial purposes pursuant to section 1407.154
145. MANUAL § 5.1, at 87.
146. See Note, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 373, 377
(1962).
147. MANUAL § 5.2, at 90.
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) (1964) provides in pertinent part:
Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any action, suit or proceeding
of a civil nature or any motion or hearing thereof, may be transferred, in the
discretion of the court, from the division in which pending to any other division
in the same district. Transfer of proceedings in rem brought by or on behalf of
the United States may be transferred under this section without the consent of
the United States where all other parties request transfer.
149. 28 u.s.c. § 1404(b) (1964).
150. MANUAL § 5.3, at 93. The same problems arise from the filing of related cases
in more than one circuit, and they should be handled by the same procedures discussed in the text.
151. See note 148 supra.
152. MANUAL § 5.32, at 94-97.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964) states in pertinent part: "For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) states in pertinent part:
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Coordination of the separate pretrials is suggested for instances
in which the entire mass of litigation cannot be transferred because
of lack of venue in the transferee forum or because of the great
(a) When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are
pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfer shall be made by
the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its
determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the
conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated: Provided, however, That
the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim
and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded.
(b) Such coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings shall be conducted
by a judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation. For this purpose, upon request of the panel, a circuit
judge or a district judge may be designated and assigned temporarily for service
in the transferee district by the Chief Justice of the United States or the chief
judge of the circuit, as may be required, in accordance with the provisions of
chapter 13 of this title. With the consent of the transferee district court, such
actions may be assigned by the panel to a judge or judges of such district. The
judge or judges to whom such actions are assigned, the members of the judicial
panel on multidistrict litigation, and other circuit and district judges designated
when needed by the panel may exercise the powers of a district judge in any
district for the purpose of conducting pretrial depositions in such coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings.
(c) Proceedings for the transfer of an action under this section may be initiated
by(i) the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation upon its own initiative, or
(ii) motion filed with the panel by a party in any action in which transfer
for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings under this section may be
appropriate. A copy of such motion shall be filed in the district court in which
the moving party's action is pending.
The panel shall give notice to the parties in all actions in which transfers for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings are contemplated, and such notice
shall specify the time and place of any hearing to determine whether such transfer
shall be made. Orders of the panel to set a hearing and other orders of the panel
issued prior to the order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed in the
office of the clerk of the district court in which a transfer hearing is to be or has
been held. The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a record of such
hearing at which material evidence may be offered by any party to an action
pending in any district that would be affected by the proceedings under this section, and shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law based
upon such record. Orders of transfer and such other orders as the panel may make
thereafter shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court of the transferee district and shall be effective when thus filed. The clerk of the transferee
district court shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of the panel's order to
transfer to the clerk of the district court from which the action is being transferred. An order denying transfer shall be filed in each district wherein there is
a case pending in which the motion for transfer has been made.
(d) The judicial panel on multidistrict litigation shall consists of seven circuit
and district judges designated from time to time by the Chief Justice of the
United States, no two of whom shall be from the same circuit, The concurrence
of four members shall be necessary to any action by the panel.
(e) No proceedings for review of any order of the panel may be permitted
except by extraordinary writ pursuant to the provisions of title 28, section 1651,
United States Code. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order of the
panel to set a transfer hearing and other orders of the panel issued prior to the
order either directing or denying transfer shall be filed only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the district in which a hearing is to be or has been
held. Petitions for an extraordinary writ to review an order to transfer or orders
subsequent to transfer shall be filed only in the court of appeals having jurisdiction over the transferee district. There shall be no appeal or review of an order
of the panel denying a motion to transfer for consolidated or coordinated pro•
ceedings.
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burden placed upon a single judge. That method of proceeding may
often prove quite effective; through coordinated planning, the
economies of combined discovery can be achieved without requiring
a party to forego his choice of forum.
If venue permits, and if justice and the convenience of the parties
will be served, transfer of related actions to one district, pursuant to
section 1404(a), is frequently the most desirable course of action.
When cases are transfered from one district to another, however,
questions of applicable law arise. The basic rule is that the law which
the transferor district would have applied must be applied in the
transferee forum. 151• Thus, the law applicable to one transfered case
may be different from the law aplicable to another, and a considerable amount of discord could result. 156 The possible confusion which
may be generated by transfer, then, should be considered first by
the original court before transfer is ordered, and again by the
transferee court when determining for what purposes consolidation
will be employed. Although potential conflicts problems may not
pose a serious threat to the utility of a transfer, since most of the
cases for which a transfer will be ordered are federal-question cases,157
those problems may prove troublesome in consolidating related actions based on state law. For example, if a number of plaintiffs seek
recovery for a product defect under the tort laws of various states,
their cases should not be consolidated for all purposes, since differences in the applicable law may change the burdens of proof which
must be met to recover or the facts which must be established for
recovery. Even in such cases, however, consolidation for discovery
purposes alone may prove to be both simple and economical. Thus,
in appropriate cases, transfer should be ordered preparatory to that
limited form of consolidation.
The value of assigning one judge to all related cases in the
separate districts is highly questionable. 158 While some of the benefits of centralized management might be achieved by applying this
assignment technique, the difficulties in efficiently scheduling motion hearings and trials, as well as the travel burden placed upon the
judge, seem to outweigh any of the advantages of that technique.159
The Manual's last suggestion for dealing with multidistrict litiga155. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
156. Letter from Professor Arthur R. Miller, Univ. of Michigan Law School, to
Chief Judge Alfred P. Murrah, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
Jan. 15, 1968, at 5-6. See Comment, The Search for the Most Convenient Federal
Forum: Three Solutions to the Problems of Multidistrict Litigation, 64 Nw. U. L. REv.
188, 196-200 (1969).
157. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
158. l\L\NUAL § 5.32(3], at 96.
159. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 7.
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tion has been made possible by the passage of section 1407, which
provides for the creation of a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.160 Unlike section 1404(a), which requires that a case be transferred in its entirety to another district, section 1407 permits the
transfer of cases solely for pretrial purposes. The order for consolidation under section 1407 is to be made by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, either on its own initiative or on petition of the
parties, whenever such action is warranted by "the convenience of
the parties and witnesses and the promotion of just and efficient conduct" of multidistrict actions.161 The limitation on the section 1407
transfer, which differentiates it from a section 1404 transfer, is that
the cases must be remanded to the transferor court for trial.162 Under
that procedure, pretrial discovery and motions can be coordinated
without burying the individual case in the mass of related cases.
The 1vfanual recommends that in some instances, after the section
160. That panel consists of seven federal circuit and district judges designated by
the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom can be from the same cir•
cuit. The concurrance of four members is necessary before any action can be taken.
Section 1407(a) provides that when civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, the actions may be transferred by the
panel to any one district so that there can be coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings. That transfer is to be made upon the panel's determination that the
transfer will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the
just and efficient conduct of such actions. Section 1407(b) provides that coordinated
or consolidated pretrial proceedings be heard by a judge or judges to whom such
actions are assigned by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. That subsection
also provides for the return of those actions to the transferor district upon completion of the consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings.
Although the panel has been in operation for only a short time, it has already
transferred massive multidistrict litigation comparable to the electrical equipment
cases. See note 14 supra. See, e.g., In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33
(1968), 298 F. Supp. 484 (1968); In re Protection Devices & Equip. Cases, 295 F. Supp.
39 (1968). The panel has also consolidated smaller groups of related cases. See, e.g.,
In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297 F. Supp. 1350 (1969) (three cases transferred); In re Mid
Air Collision Near Henderson, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039 (1969) (two cases transferred).
In both of the latter transfers, however, a considerable number of related cases were
already pending at the time of transfer. In a case in which the motion concerned only
two cases and they involved no "exceptional" common issues of fact, the panel denied
transfer of the two cases. In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543 (1969).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). The panel has stressed this twofold
test of transfer. The convenience test looks to the convenience of all the parties and
all the witnesses; indeed, the panel has transferred several actions in which the inconvenience of one party has been overridden by looking at all the actions as a whole.
See In re Library Editions of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385 (1968); In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (1968); In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater Cincinnati Airport, Constancy, Ky., 298 F. Supp. 353 (1968) (one defendant named in only
one action; motion for severance from a § 1407 transfer denied). The promotion of
just and efficient conduct is important in the transfer of cases which have different
legal theories but similar fact situations (see note 163 infra), and in the denial of
transfer when the pretrial proceedings in some of the related actions are nearly complete. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323 (1969); In re
Protection Devices & Equip. Cases, 295 F. Supp. 39 (1968); In re Eisler Patents, 297 F.
Supp. 1034 (1968) (Most of the related cases in which transfer was requested had already been dismissed in court.).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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1407 procedures are completed, further consolidation for trial
through the use of section 1404 may be desirable.163 However, an
additional standard must be met to permit transfer under section
1404. Section I 404(a) requires that the transferee court be one "where
the case might have been brought" in the first instance. 164 That
provision preserves both the venue requirements for trial and the
parties choice of forum. It also permits separate trials of local issues
and avoids many of the problems of determining the applicable law.
But most cases in which consolidation for pretrial purposes under
section 1407 is advantageous seem likely to profit also from consolidation for trial under section 1404.165 Still, if the standard of section
1404 is not met, the benefits of that consolidation will be lost.
When only a section 1407 pretrial consolidation is made and
there is no consolidation for trial, further problems arise. For
example, the close control of the case by a single judge-one of the
principal recommendations of the Manual 166-is lost when the case
is returned to various district courts for trial. The Manual does suggest that conferences be held among all of the judges involved in
such trials, 167 but that seems to be an inadequate remedy. Certainly,
the possibility of conflicting judgments on similar facts is increased
by the very fact that many different judges or juries are hearing the
related cases. Nevertheless, that objection to the section 1407 procedure should not be controlling if it is determined that the interests
in having local courts decide local issues, in preventing possible
conflicts in the applicable law, and in preserving forum protection
override the considerations which gave rise to the basic expediting
procedures of the Manual.
Another objection that will have to be faced in attempting to
use a section 1407 transfer is the suggestion that transfer be denied
if there is a significant possibility of settlement before trial. 168 How163. MANUAL § 5.32[4], at 96.
164. 28 U .S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
165. In the electrical equipment cases, over twenty § 1404 motions followed the
closing of consolidated discovery. Many were granted at the court's discretion over
the parties' objections. See, e.g., I.T .E. Circuit Breaker Co. v. Regan, 348 F.2d 403 (8th
Cir. 1965); I.T.E. Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965); see
Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings Under Proposed Section 1407 of the
Judicial Code: Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 558,
562 (1966). The panel, however, has transferred several cases in which the underlying
legal doctrines differed and thus in which a combined trial would not be so advantageous. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (1969); In re 4th Class
Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326 (1969); In re Air Crash Disaster at Greater
Cincinnati Airport, Constancy, Ky., 295 F. Supp. 51 (1968).
Trials that may be transferred under § 1404(a) may not be transferred for pretrial consolidation under § 1407. For a discussion of the possible conflict in application of §§ 140!(a) and 1407, see Comment, supra note 156, at 203-05.
166. MANUAL § 0.3, at 12; § 1.1, at 18-19. These provisions are carryovers of the
primary recommendations of the Prettyman Report and the Handbook.
167. MANUAL § 5.32[3], at 96.
168. See Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings, supra note 165, at 573-75.
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ever, experience in the electrical equipment cases and in other cases
seems to indicate that there is a greater simplification of the issues
and thus more out-of-court settlements when all related issues are
consolidated for discovery.
A final problem with section 1407 involves the availability of a
procedure for appealing the panel's orders. Section 1407(e) provides
that appeals shall be by extraordinary writ and that they shall be
made only in the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the
transferee court. Furthermore, no review exists for the denial of a
motion to transfer. Those rules may cause the parties some difficulty,
particularly since any undue cost or burden on the parties arising
from the transfer to a distant court would be increased by their having to process the appeal in the appellate court of that same jurisdiction.169 Accordingly, unless section 1407 is amended to permit
review of a transfer order by the appellate court having jurisdiction
over the transferor court, the panel must be sensitive to the added
and perhaps prohibitive costs of appealing its order. When the
merits of a particular transfer are doubtful, the panel should refrain
from ordering that transfer, since review of the decision by an appellate court is unlikely.
X.

CONCLUSION

Out of the many procedures and recommendations of the Manual
and the various responses to them, one prime requisite stands out:
that adequate flexibility is needed in applying and adopting the
suggestions of the Manual. 110 If those suggestions are applied only
when their application is appropriate, they will greatly increase the
efficiency of judicial administration while still providing the framework within which a just determination of the issues in controversy
can be achieved. If they are used improperly or too rigidly, however,
the achievement of both efficiency and justice may be frustrated. 171
It has been argued that a member of the judiciary who has had
limited experience in handling complicated litigation would be
swayed by the fact that the Manual is the product of a distinguished
panel of judges and was published with the imprimatur of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.172 Such a judge, the arguThat Comment also recommends that the panel, in determining whether to grant
transfer, consider the number of cases to be consolidated and the number and com·
plexity of the issues involved.
169. Id. at 565-73.
170. See Outline Memorandum, supra note 41, at l; A.C.T.L. Report, supra note
22, at 1-6; Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 1-5; Special Meeting, supra note
51, at 11-39 (remarks of Leonard J. Emerglick, Washington, D.C.).
171. Pendleton Memorandum, supra note 62, at 2.
172. See note 1 supra.
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ment runs, might, mistakenly, give the Manual's suggestions the
status of inflexible rules, rather than using them selectively to fit the
needs of the specific case.173 Moreover, since complex cases are generally unique, such unwaivering application will discourage needed
experimentation.174 Responding to that criticism, the Manual states
that not all of the recommendations are suitable for every complex
case, 175 and that both judges and lawyers are encouraged to adapt
and improve them.176 But that general implication of flexibility is
tempered by the statement that the Manual's suggestions, when used
in appropriate cases, are the most efficient and just procedures which
have yet been devised. 177
With the backlog of cases and the prolonged delays that now exist
in most courts, there clearly is a pressing need for the development of
effective modem techniques of judicial management. But the
methods employed to clear dockets must ultimately comport with
the fundamental goal of providing substantial justice in all cases.178
Because the Manual has a potentially far-reaching effect, the attainment of that goal requires that the application of the Manual's
recommendations be flexible. 179 Thus, while the Manual provides
many potentially useful tools for the achievement of efficient judicial
administration, each court, in order to maximize that potential, must
retain the authority to apply those tools in a flexible and innovative
manner.
173. Special Meeting, supra note 51, at 42 (remarks of Don M. Jackson of Jackson,
Barker &: Sherman, Kansas City, Mo.); A.C.T.L. Report, supra note 22, at 2.
174. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 3.
175. MANUAL 7.
176. An important indication that the Manual is intended to be flexible and to
reflect advances in technique is that the Appendix in the version put out by the
Committee is in loose-leaf form. See Proc. of the Co-Ordinating Comm. on Complex
and Multidistrict Litigation, Denver, June 4, 1968, at 37 (remarks of Professor Arthur
R. Miller of the Univ. of Michigan Law School). In addition, members of the judiciary
are asked to document important rulings on evidentiary and procedural matters arising in the big case in order that the Manual may be kept up to date. MANUAL 5 n.l.
Finally, changes in language have been made throughout the text to emphasize the
need for experimentation and the employment of a flexible approach suitable to the
case at hand. Becker Memorandum supra note 139, at 1. See note 2 supra.
177. A similar "give and take" statement occurs in § 0.4 in which the Manual
states:
It is not intended, however, to recommend an inflexible program of holding
only four principal pretrial conferences. The suggestions made herein are subject
always to the discretion of each judge to adapt the procedures to the particular
case or to deviate and innovate where necessary or desirable. However, the first
principal (Preliminary) and final pretrial conferences ordinarily should be held.
Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).
178. Cravath Memorandum, supra note 21, at 9.
179. Jackson Memorandum, supra note 125, at 6. See also text accompanying notes
170-71 supra.

